New Guidelines for Water Security - Will They Affect Stormwater?
If you’re wondering what the next item on your stormwater program’s agenda might be, recently released security guidelines might be just the thing for a little late-night reading. The American Society of Civil Engineers has issued two sets of draft guidelines, in conjunction with the American Water Works Association and the Water Environment Federation, dealing with physical security for water and wastewater/stormwater facilities.
An earlier document titled “Interim Voluntary Guidelines for Designing an Online Contaminant Monitoring System,” which may be of more relevance for stormwater operations, is also available.
The documents deal with protecting water treatment and conveyance systems from people who are trying to cause deliberate harm, including physical damage and casualties; among the threats mentioned are domestic and international terrorists. The guidelines suggest security measures to either detect or delay the actions of several types of wrongdoers: vandals, criminals, saboteurs, and insiders. The measures include such things as perimeter fencing, key-locked or electronic-access entrance gates, guardhouses, and closed-circuit TV cameras at various facilities, as well as locks or intrusion-detection devices on manhole covers.
There is an obvious need for security for drinking water sources and supply lines; what is less clear is why someone would want to attack part of the wastewater or stormwater infrastructure when so much more-lethal damage could be done by going after the drinking water supply. But, as the guidelines for wastewater/stormwater utilities point out, crippling its wastewater treatment facility would have serious consequences for a community: “A wastewater treatment plant that cannot provide adequate capacity or performance due to a malevolent activity could discharge an effluent with significantly impaired quality that may create a public health hazard or cause environmental damage of the downstream receiving water or receiving environment.” Conceivably, in areas with combined sewer systems, gaining entry to a possibly easier-to-access storm drain would allow damage to the entire system.
Pumping stations have a chapter of their own in the guidelines, and while these refer primarily to pumps that are part of a wastewater or stormwater conveyance system, pumps used for flood control might be another concern. Pumps used to dewater a flooded area—or, as in New Orleans, say, where a populated area would quickly become flooded without constant pumping—could be a vulnerable target.
The guidelines encourage facility managers to conduct vulnerability assessments and then think about options. For example, maybe you don’t want to spend the money to increase security on all a facility’s assets, but you can plan instead for backup systems in case something goes wrong; one example given is bypassing a damaged pumping station or using a portable pump if an unprotected permanent pump is damaged.
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If stormwater programs eventually adopt some or all of these measures, where will the money come from to pay for them? What parts of existing stormwater activities—for example, an illicit discharge detection and elimination program—might mesh with security efforts? Inventorying the stormwater infrastructure is a huge job that many NPDES Phase II communities are undertaking, some for the first time in many years, with an eye to assessing the locations of outfalls and the condition of the system and making future maintenance and upgrades easier. In many places, with the help of GIS software, the information is being widely shared and sometimes even posted on publicly accessible Web sites. While an existing inventory could be useful in terms of security, there’s a flip side as well: Should access to this information be restricted? Are we posting roadmaps for someone who’s looking for weak spots in the system? We’ll be looking at the issue in more detail in an upcoming issue of Stormwater, as well as in our sister publication Water Efficiency (www.waterefficiency.net).
The documents are available at http://www.asce.org/static/1/wise.cfm and are being released for trial use and public comment. The work was funded by the EPA. The ASCE is accepting comments at wise@asce.org.
March-April 2007
New Guidelines for Water Security - Will They Affect Stormwater?
If you’re wondering what the next item on your stormwater program’s agenda might be, recently released security guidelines might be just the thing for a little late-night reading. The American Society of Civil Engineers has issued two sets of draft guidelines, in conjunction with the American Water Works Association and the Water Environment Federation, dealing with physical security for water and wastewater/stormwater facilities.
An earlier document titled “Interim Voluntary Guidelines for Designing an Online Contaminant Monitoring System,” which may be of more relevance for stormwater operations, is also available.
The documents deal with protecting water treatment and conveyance systems from people who are trying to cause deliberate harm, including physical damage and casualties; among the threats mentioned are domestic and international terrorists. The guidelines suggest security measures to either detect or delay the actions of several types of wrongdoers: vandals, criminals, saboteurs, and insiders. The measures include such things as perimeter fencing, key-locked or electronic-access entrance gates, guardhouses, and closed-circuit TV cameras at various facilities, as well as locks or intrusion-detection devices on manhole covers.
There is an obvious need for security for drinking water sources and supply lines; what is less clear is why someone would want to attack part of the wastewater or stormwater infrastructure when so much more-lethal damage could be done by going after the drinking water supply. But, as the guidelines for wastewater/stormwater utilities point out, crippling its wastewater treatment facility would have serious consequences for a community: “A wastewater treatment plant that cannot provide adequate capacity or performance due to a malevolent activity could discharge an effluent with significantly impaired quality that may create a public health hazard or cause environmental damage of the downstream receiving water or receiving environment.” Conceivably, in areas with combined sewer systems, gaining entry to a possibly easier-to-access storm drain would allow damage to the entire system.
Pumping stations have a chapter of their own in the guidelines, and while these refer primarily to pumps that are part of a wastewater or stormwater conveyance system, pumps used for flood control might be another concern. Pumps used to dewater a flooded area—or, as in New Orleans, say, where a populated area would quickly become flooded without constant pumping—could be a vulnerable target.
The guidelines encourage facility managers to conduct vulnerability assessments and then think about options. For example, maybe you don’t want to spend the money to increase security on all a facility’s assets, but you can plan instead for backup systems in case something goes wrong; one example given is bypassing a damaged pumping station or using a portable pump if an unprotected permanent pump is damaged.
If stormwater programs eventually adopt some or all of these measures, where will the money come from to pay for them? What parts of existing stormwater activities—for example, an illicit discharge detection and elimination program—might mesh with security efforts? Inventorying the stormwater infrastructure is a huge job that many NPDES Phase II communities are undertaking, some for the first time in many years, with an eye to assessing the locations of outfalls and the condition of the system and making future maintenance and upgrades easier. In many places, with the help of GIS software, the information is being widely shared and sometimes even posted on publicly accessible Web sites. While an existing inventory could be useful in terms of security, there’s a flip side as well: Should access to this information be restricted? Are we posting roadmaps for someone who’s looking for weak spots in the system? We’ll be looking at the issue in more detail in an upcoming issue of Stormwater, as well as in our sister publication Water Efficiency (www.waterefficiency.net).
The documents are available at http://www.asce.org/static/1/wise.cfm and are being released for trial use and public comment. The work was funded by the EPA. The ASCE is accepting comments at wise@asce.org.